The Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis
Many linguists, including Noam Chomsky, contend that language, in the way we normally perceive it, is a historical, social or political notion rather than a scientific one. For example, German and Dutch are much closer to one another than various dialects of Chinese are. However, the rough, commonsense divisions between languages will suffice for our purposes.
There are around 5000 languages in use today and each is quite different from the others. Differences are especially emphasized between languages of different families, e.g., between Indo-European languages like English and Hindi and Ancient Greek, on the one hand, and non-Indo-European languages like Hopi and Chinese and Swahili, on the other.
Many thinkers have urged that great differences in language lead to great differences in experience and thought. They argue that each language embodies a worldview, so that speakers of different languages think about the world in quite different ways. This view is sometimes called the Whorf-hypothesis or the Whorf-Sapir hypothesis, after the linguists who made if famous. But the label linguistic relativity, which is more common today, has the advantage to make separating the hypothesis from the details of Whorf's views, which are an endless subject of exegetical dispute (Gumperz and Levinson, 1996, contains a sampling of recent literature on the hypothesis).
It certainly is appealing to discuss how different languages carve up the world in different ways and that, as a result, their speakers think about language differently. But questions about the impact language has on thought are empirical questions that can only be settled by empirical investigation. And although linguistic relativism is perhaps the most popular version of descriptive relativism, the conviction and passion of partisans on both sides of the issue far outrun the available evidence. As usual in discussions of relativism, it is important to resist all-or-none thinking. The key question is whether there are interesting and justifiable versions of linguistic relativism between those that are trivially true (the Babylonians didn't have a counterpart of the word ‘telephone’, so they didn't think about telephones) and those that are dramatic but almost certainly false (those who speak different languages see the world in completely different ways).